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NOTES
THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1983 TO THE
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS-MAINE
V. THIBOUTOT
Most challenges to state welfare practices based on alleged conflict with
the Social Security Act have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' which
provides a cause of action for deprivation under color of state law of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
Initially, courts interpreted section 1983 to be applicable only to violations of
constitutional rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 2 This strict
construction was subsequently relaxed when actions brought under section
1983 alleging both constitutional and statutory violations were decided
strictly on statutory grounds. 3  The rationale employed in these decisions
was that the constitutional claim provided the federal court with the power
to hear the state law claim under the court's pendent jurisdiction. 4  The
1. Note, The Propriety of Granting a Federal Hearing for Statutorily Based Actions Under
the Reconstruction-Era Civil Rights Acts: Blue v. Craig, 43 CEo. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1345
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Federal Hearing]. Section 1983 of Title 42 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be consid-
ered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970) (plaintiff must show
that defendant deprived him of a constitutional right); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)
(plain purpose of § 1983 is to enforce the fourteenth amendment). See generally Federal
Hearing, supra note 1, at 1347-48. The original 1871 enactment which became § 1983 was
explicitly limited to protecting constitutional rights. See note 53 infra.
3. See, e.g., Yovakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 236 (1976) (per curiam) (allegations of denial
of constitutional right and statutory right under the Social Security Act requires that statutory
issue be decided first); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1974) (in § 1983 action, where
violations of fourteenth amendment and Social Security Act are alleged, and statutory claim is
dispositive, the constitutional issue need not be addressed); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543
(1974) (where constitutional issue and statutory claim are brought in federal court, the statutory
claim is addressed first and the constitutional issue is not reached if the statutory claim is
dispositive).
4. Pendent jurisdiction is the power exercised by a federal court to hear a state law claim.
When a state law claim and a substantial federal claim arise from common operative facts,
pendent jurisdiction can be used to hear both claims in one proceeding. United Mineworkers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (federal district court has jurisdiction to hear action brought for
alleged violations of federal labor law and state law). Exercise of pendent jurisdiction is within
the sound discretion of the court. The advantages of pendent jurisdiction are economy of judicial
resources, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 (1974);
United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). See generally Note, The Evolution and
Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018
(1962).
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judicial policy was that a decision grounded in statutory law was preferable
to one based on constitutional law. 5
Recently, in Maine v. Thiboutot, the United States Supreme Court for the
first time definitively held that a section 1983 claim can be based solely on
the state violation of a federal statutory right. 7 Furthermore, the Thiboutot
Court held that a state can be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs of enforcing
a federal statutory right because the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 19768 provides that the prevailing party in a section 1983 action can be
awarded attorney's fees."
Although pendent jurisdiction will allow a federal court to hear a state law claim that is part
of an action brought under § 1983, there must also be a federal jurisdictional basis for the § 1983
action itself. Federal jurisdiction for § 1983 actions is generally based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1976). Federal Hearing, supra note 1, at 1344-45. This jurisdictional statute provides that
district courts have original jurisdiction of a civil action intended, in part, to redress deprivations
of rights provided by the Constitution, federal laws providing for equal rights, or federal laws
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-
1343(4) (1976). In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court held that an action brought under § 1983 that merely alleged that state
welfare regulations conflicted with the Social Security Act was not an action for which
§§ 1343(3) or 1343(4) conferred federal jurisdiction. Id. at 611-15. See notes 21 & 79 and
accompanying text infra.
5. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (decision based on constitutional grounds is to be written as
narrowly as possible but, if it can be decided on statutory grounds, the constitutional issue should
be avoided); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (issue is to be decided
by the construction of a state statute rather than on constitutional grounds whenever possible).
6. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Powell,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, filed a dissenting opinion.
7. 448 U.S. at 4. Prior to Thiboutot, lower courts were divided as to whether § 1983
applied only when deprivation of a constitutional right was alleged. Some courts had expressly
held that a deprivation of a constitutional right was a necessary element of maintaining an action
under § 1983. See, e.g., Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 167 (8th Cir. 1980); Randall v.
Coldmark, 495 F.2d 356, 358 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974); McCall
v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Morin, 91 Misc. 2d 302, 306, 398
N.Y.S.2d 36, 46 (1977), aff'd as modified, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979); Lange v.
Nature Conservancy, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 416, 421, 601 P.2d 963, 966 (1979). Several other
courts, on the other hand, had held that § 1983 extended coverage to deprivations of federal
statutory rights. See, e.g., Louise B. v. Coluatti, 606 F.2d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 1979); Togol v.
Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979); Blue v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 835 (4th Cir. 1974);
Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 579 (5th Cir. 1969); Bomar v. Keyes,
162 F.2d 136, 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
8. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat.
2641, amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to provide:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in a civil action or
proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging
a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added),
9. 448 U.S. at 9. On the same day as Thiboutot, the Court decided Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122 (1980), holding that a § 1983 claim arising out of a state's violation of the Social
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The Thiboutot Court provided no new bases for its position in spite of the
case's uniqueness and far-reaching impact. An analysis of the Court's ration-
ale shows that it was based primarily on the questionable plain meaning of
section 1983. Further support was garnered from the ambiguity of the legis-
lative history of section 1983 and the dicta of prior distinguishable decisions.
This Note suggests, however, that the Court could have reached the same,
but a stronger, conclusion if it had examined current public policy enunci-
ated by Congress.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lionel and Joline Thiboutot received Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) 10 benefits from the Maine Department of Human Serv-
ices." The Thiboutot family included eight children. Four of the children
were from their marriage, one was hers from a prior marriage, and three
were his from a prior marriage.'2 In accordance with its own regulation,1 3
Maine computed Lionel Thiboutot's available income to determine the
amount of AFDC benefits allowable for his three children and refused to
deduct his expenses in support of the four children of his current marriage,
despite his legal obligation to support them.
After exhausting the state administrative remedies, which resulted in a
final adverse decision by the commissioner of the Maine Department of
Human Services, the Thiboutots sought judicial review in a Maine Superior
Court, naming the state and commissioner as defendants.14 The Thiboutot's
amended complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the
defendants, by enforcing the state regulation, had violated the Social Secur-
ity Act, of which AFDC is part, and applicable federal regulations.' 5 Class
relief was also sought. ' 6
Security Act justifies an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. In contrast to
Thiboutot, the plaintiff in Gagne brought the action in federal court and also alleged a violation
of the fourteenth amendment. 448 U.S. at 125. The specific issue before the Court in Gagne was
whether attorney's fees could be awarded against state officials to a plaintiff who prevailed as the
result of a consent decree, without a determination that any constitutional rights had been
violated. 448 U.S. at 124.
10. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976),
formerly titled Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), is a federal program within the Social
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397f (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), for appropriating federal funds for each participating
state so that the state can furnish financial aid to needy dependent children and the parents or
relatives with whom they live. The express purposes of the legislation are to encourage the care
of dependent children in the homes of their parents or relatives, to maintain and strengthen
family life, and to aid parents or relatives to attain or retain self-support. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
11. Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 232 (Me. 1979).
12. Id.
13. 448 U.S. at 3.
14. 405 A.2d at 232.
15. Id. The primary federal regulation involved was 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1980),
which defines available income and resources of AFDC recipients.
16. 405 A.2d at 232.
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The trial court entered judgment on the merits for the Thiboutots and
enjoined the state from enforcing the challenged state regulation. 7  The
court also ordered the adoption of new regulations, notification to class
members of the new regulations, payment of retroactive AFDC benefits to
the Thiboutots, and payment of prospective AFDC benefits to eligible mem-
bers of the class. Payment of retroactive AFDC benefits to the class and an
award of attorney's fees to the Thiboutots, however, were denied.' 8 The
Thiboutots appealed these two aspects of the judgment to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine.' 9
The state supreme court held that recovery of retroactive benefits by class
members was not warranted. 20  The court held, however, that section 1983
does provide a remedy, cognizable in state court, for deprivation of AFDC
benefits even though such benefits are not of a constitutional dimension.2
The court also stated that section 1988, which provides for an award of
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The defendants complied with the order and did not cross-appeal. Id.
20. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held in Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d
541 (Me. 1978), that sovereign immunity prohibits a retroactive award of AFDC benefits to a
class unless the state has consented to be sued, The state court in Thiboutot found no express
consent in state law or regulations to be sued for retroactive AFDC benefits and no waiver of
sovereign immunity in either the state welfare regulations or the state's failure to appeal the
award of retroactive AFDC benefits to the Thiboutots. 405 A.2d at 233-35.
21. 405 A.2d at 236. The court noted that Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441
U.S. 600 (1979), could arguably be read to preclude a § 1983 action absent a constitutional basis.
Based on its reading of Chapman as holding only that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3)-1343(4) deny federal
jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim alleging merely a conflict between a state welfare regulation and
the Social Security Act, and its notation that the Chapman Court was widely divided on the
scope of § 1983, the Maine court held that no definitive answer had yet been provided by the
Supreme Court. 405 A.2d at 235-36. Accord, Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646-47 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980). The Chapman majority opinion, delivered by Justice
Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, took
no position on the scope of § 1983, relying merely upon its procedural character. 441 U.S. at 617.
In a concurring opinion, three of these justices stated that § 1983 provides no cause of action
absent a deprivation of a constitutional right or a statutory right that guarantees equal rights
because § 1983 is historically limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Id. at 625-40 (Burger, C.J., and
Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). The four remaining Justices stated that § 1983 does
provide a cause of action for state violations of the Social Security Act. Id. at 670-72 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 672-75 (Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
There is authority, however, for the proposition that a statute that is intended to provide a
minimum level of subsistence does secure equal rights and, therefore, is of a constitutional
dimension. See Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 579 (5th Cir. 1969)
(state's denial of benefit of wages provided by federal statute to migratory farm workers is
deprivation of a civil right for which § 1983 provides a remedy). Cf. Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552-56 (1972) (state's allowance of pre-judicial garnishment of savings
account is deprivation of basic civil right for which § 1983 provides a remedy); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (welfare recipients are entitled to procedural due process
before termination of benefits). Contra, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. at
621; Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) (welfare benefits are not a fundamental right
and there is no constitutional obligation to provide a minimum level of support). See generally
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a section 1983 action, is applicable to
the states.22  Since the lower court failed to explain whether an award of
attorney's fees was denied because section 1988 was inapplicable or because
fees were not justified, the supreme court remanded for reconsideration of
this issue. 23 The United States Supreme Court granted the defendants' writ
of certiorari2 4 and affirmed the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine.25
COURT's RATIONALE
The Court specifically addressed two issues. 26  The first was whether the
scope of section 1983 includes claims based solely on violations of federal
statutory law.2 7 The second issue, if such claims were maintainable under
section 1983, was whether attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing
party pursuant to section 1988.28 The Court concluded that both issues must
be answered affirmatively.
The Court provided one dispositive and two supportive bases in determin-
ing that a violation of federal statutory law, absent any constitutional claim,
is encompassed by section 1983. The Court first stated that the plain mean-
ing of the phrase "any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws"
within section 1983 does not limit the statute's application to those laws
dealing exclusively with constitutional rights. Noting that section 1983 does
not qualify those laws embraced by the phrase "and laws," the Court ruled
that the statutory language clearly includes within its coverage a claim that a
state violated the Social Security Act.2 9
22. 405 A.2d at 237-39.
23. Id. at 239-40.
24. 444 U.S. 1042 (1980).
25. 448 U.S. at 4.
26. Id. at 3. The defendants raised a third issue, arguing that state courts do not have
jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980), held that a state court was not prohibited from hearing
§ 1983 actions. 448 U.S. at 3 n.1. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36 n.17 (1976) (Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (joinder of county in § 1983 action results in a state law
claim not within federal diversity jurisdiction and, thereby, implies § 1983 action is cognizable
in state court); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 490-94, 254 N.W.2d 704, 709-11 (1977) (action
brought under § 1983 by prisoner for violation of constitutional rights by county police officer
can be heard by state court because jurisdiction is not exclusively reserved by federal courts). See
also Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section
1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 L. & Soc. ORD. 557, 575-76. Judge Aldisert not
only accepted that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of § 1983 claims, but stated that,
with the expansion of § 1983, the state courts should be relied upon to ease the burden of these
actions on the federal courts. Id. at 573.
27. 448 U.S. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4. The dissent, on the other hand, asserted that the meaning of the language is not
plain, clear, and unambiguous. Id. at 13 n.1 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting). See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
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As support for its interpretation of the statute's plain meaning, the Court
found in its prior decisions a second basis for applying section 1983 to purely
federal statutory violations.3 0 Dictum in several cases indicated that section
1983 was available to remedy violations of federal statutory rights."' Fur-
thermore, several section 1983 cases involving the Social Security Act, while
raising constitutional issues, were decided solely on statutory grounds.
3 2
The final supportive basis for the Court's determination that the scope of
section 1983 included violations of merely federal statutory law was its
interpretation of the statute's legislative history.33 The Court first found
that the legislative history of section 1983 and its predecessor statutes pro-
vided no definitive answer regarding the meaning of "and laws."3 4 Second,
the Court stated that nothing in the legislative history indicated that the
plain meaning of "and laws" was not meant.3 5  Finally, the majority viewed
congressional silence in the wake of the Court's prior decisions as an accept-
ance of the Court's implicit expansion of the scope of section 1983 in past
decisions. In the opinion of the Court, if "and laws" is to be qualified in any
way, it is the responsibility of Congress to do so.a
Having decided that section 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of a
federal statutory right, the Thiboutot Court easily resolved the issue of
whether section 1988 authorizes an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
party in such an action. Again, the plain meaning of the statutory language
was examined first.3 7 Section 1988 provides that "any action . . . to enforce
section[s] . . . 1983" enables a court, in its discretion, to award attorney's
30. Id. at 4. The Court intimated that a holding based on the plain meaning of § 1983 is
sufficient because the statutory language is unambiguous. Prior decisions, however, were cited as
precedential support for its interpretation of the breadth of § 1983. Id.
31. Id. at 4-5. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01
(1978) ("[section] 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy, to be
broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights"); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) ("Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), held that suits in
federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social
Security Act on the part of participating States"); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
543 n.7 (1972) ("the [predecessor to § 1983] was enlarged to provide protection for rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by federal law .... ); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808,
829-30 (1966) ("[state] officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of
rights conferred by federal equal rights laws, but of violations of other federal constitutional and
statutory rights as well"); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 525-26 (1939) ("[the predecessor to
§ 1983] was extended to include rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the
United States as well as by the Constitution"). The Thiboutot dissenters refused to accept these
cases as authority that § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal statutory rights. 448
U.S. at 26-29 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). See notes 68-70 and
accompanying text infra.
32. 448 U.S. at 6. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
33. 448 U.S. at 7-8.
34. Id. at 7. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text infra.
35. 448 U.S. at 8.
36. Id. Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (courts are only to determine a statute's
meaning and constitutionality, not the wisdom with which it was passed).
37. 448 U.S. at 9.
fees to the prevailing party.38 Thus, once a claim is determined to be
legitimately brought under section 1983, attorney's fees can be awarded. The
Court also noted that the legislative history of section 1988 is consistent with
the statute's plain meaning. 39 It cited statements by sponsors of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act that indicated the statute should apply to
suits arising out of violations of federal statutory rights, as well as constitu-
tional rights. 40  Accordingly, the majority had no doubts that Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act knowing that it would




That section 1988 allows a court discretion to award attorney's fees in any
legitimate section 1983 action cannot be seriously disputed. 42 The primary
issue in Thiboutot, therefore, centered on whether a state's alleged violation
of a federal statute, absent a related constitutional question, was legitimately
brought under section 1983.43 The Court offered three justifications for an
affirmative resolution of this issue. Analysis of these rationales shows that
they are not sufficient to support the Court's expansion of section 1983 to
include purely statutorily-based actions. The majority's expansive interpreta-
tion of section 1983 could have been justified by the Congress' public policy
declarations regarding section 1983 articulated during the enactment of the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. Unfortunately, the Court did not
look to this current expression of legislative intent. By passing the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, Congress intended to broaden the rem-
edy available under section 1983, which Congress explicitly viewed as pro-
viding a remedy for violations of federal statutory law. 44
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 9-10. See note 73 infra.
41. 448 U.S. at 10. Whereas the majority stated that the meaning of § 1983 was clear and
plain, and that the statute's legislative history and case law interpretation did not indicate any
meaning to the contrary, the dissent's basic premise was that the statute's meaning was not clear
and plain on its face. Id. at 12 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Because
the statutory language needed interpretation, the legislative history was analyzed. Unlike the
majority, the dissent stated that the legislative history necessitated limiting the scope of § 1983 to
deprivations of constitutional rights or rights guaranteed by statutes providing for equal rights.
Id. at 14-19. The dissent concluded that although the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
applies to all § 1983 actions, the Thiboutot's claim was not properly within the scope of § 1983
and, therefore, attorney's fees could not be awarded. Id. at 24.
42. The dissent's only argument against the majority's bare holding that an award of
attorney's fees under § 1988 is possible for any legitimate § 1983 action was that the legislative
history that the majority cited was not sufficient to support the consequences of Thiboutot. Id. at
25 n.14. See note 73 infra.
43. 448 U.S. at 3.
44. See notes 73 & 95 and accompanying text infra.
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Critique of the Thiboutot Decision
The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of "any rights ... secured by
the Constitution and laws" includes purely statutory violations because the
phrase is not qualified to limit section 1983 to a specific subset of laws, such
as laws providing for equal rights.45 In fact, the majority stated that on the
basis of this language alone, the Thiboutot's claim was encompassed by
section 1983.46
Reliance on a statute's plain meaning is intellectually unsatisfying. The
plain meaning rule of statutory construction states that when a statute's
language is clear and unambiguous, a court need not look any further to
construe it if this interpretation is not absurd or wholly impracticable. 47 Use
of the plain meaning rule, however, implicitly denies that words are inher-
ently unclear or can change meaning over time.48 Furthermore, it can act as
a talisman to avoid establishing the legislative intent behind the passage of a
statute.49  In Thiboutot, these consequences are evident. As the dissent
noted, the phrase "any rights. . . secured by the Constitution and laws" can
easily be interpreted to have a plain meaning other than the one ascribed to
it by the majority. The use of the conjunctive "and" instead of the disjunctive
"or" could indicate that a right must also be secured by the Constitution to
be within the purview of section 1983.50 Given this ambiguity in the lan-
guage, the Court's reliance on the plain meaning rule was inappropriate.
45. 448 U.S. at 4. Section 1983 does not, for example, read "any rights ... secured by the
Constitution and laws providing for equal rights." Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) (district court
has original jurisdiction of any civil action alleging deprivation of "any right ... secured by the
Constitution. . .or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights. ... ). Section 1983 is not
a law that provides for equal rights. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,
617 (1979).
46. 448 U.S. at 4. "[T]he plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents'
claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act." Id. (emphasis added).
47, See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (federal statute providing
that personal property of veteran without will or legal heirs who dies in veterans' hospital vests in
federal government is clear and unequivocal, making analysis of legislative history unnecessary);
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) (no need to resort to legislative
history because act allowing supervisory employees to join union is unambiguous); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (statutory language of Mann Act is clear and unambig-
uous, thereby making further inquiry of legislative intent unnecessary). See generally 2A SUTHER-
LAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973) [hereinafter
cited as SUTHERLAND].
Even if the language is clear, however, consideration of the legislative history is not precluded
by any rule of law. Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976).
48. Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. DAY. L. REV. 31, 32-33
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Merz]; Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule"
and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1315
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
49. Murphy, supra note 48, at 1315-16.
50. 448 U.S. at 13 n.1 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The dissent
did not believe that, based on legislative history, the majority's construction should be this
restrictive. Because the language was subject to more than one meaning, legislative history was a
necessary aid to interpretation. Id.
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Under these circumstances, the origins of the statute-the legislative intent
as determined through legislative materials-should have been examined in
order to aid in its construction."5 Rather than relying on legislative history
as an aid to the interpretation to be given section 1983, however, the major-
ity merely used the legislative history as support for its previously determined
conclusion based on the plain meaning rule. The majority simply stated that
the inconclusiveness of the statute's history did not warrant an interpretation
other than the plain meaning as the majority interpreted it. 2 Even though
the majority was not justified in relying on the plain meaning rule, it was
correct in its conclusion that the legislative history of section 1983 was not
dispositive of the focal issue in Thiboutot.
The evolution of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 began with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,' 3 popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. 54  The
rights secured under this legislation were the same rights guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. As with the current section 1983, the Ku Klux Klan
Act created no substantive rights.55 In 1866, Congress authorized the revi-
sion of all federal statutes then in effect. 56 Among the duties with which the
Revision Commission was charged was "omitting redundant or obsolete
enactments, and making such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile the
contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend the imperfections of the
original text." '5 7 Passed before the revision had been completed, the Ku Klux
51. Id. at 13-14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 (1972) (both
statutory language and legislative history must be considered when interpreting § 1983); United
States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940) (because language of military reenlistment statute
can be reasonably interpreted in differing ways, legislative materials are to be considered in spite
of their possible ambiguity). See also Merz, supra note 48, at 39-40; Murphy, supra note 48, at
1314-17.
52. 448 U.S. at 7-8. Cf. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 610 (1979)
(legislative history of § 1983 and § 1343 does not provide definitive answer to the interpretation
of their relationship).
53. Entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, and for other Purposes," § 1 provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall .. .be
liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (revised by Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1878)).
54. Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 H~av. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1, 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Herzer]. The congressional debates over its enactment
are collected at 1 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTs 597-653 (B. Schwartz
ed. 1970).
55. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). See also Cover,
Establishing Federal Jurisdiction in Actions Brought to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights
When No Violations of Constitutional Rights Are Alleged, 2 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.5, 7 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Cover]; Herzer, supra note 54, at 5.
56. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74-75.
57. id. § 2.
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Klan Act was also revised but remained virtually identical to its predecessor
except for the insertion of the phrase "and laws."' 58 The current codification
is substantively identical to the revised version. 59 In its report, the Revision
Commission did not explain the absence of an annotation accompanying the
revised statute to clarify the addition of "and laws."' 0 Thus, in interpreting
the legislative intent in adding "and laws," the Thiboutot Court was reduced
to determining why the commission omitted an annotation. Two interpreta-
tions of this omission have been postulated. One is that Congress accepted
this change intending that "and laws," by its plain meaning, would broaden
the scope of section 1983. A contrary position is that Congress meant no
substantive change. Under this latter view, the addition of "and laws" was
meant only to ensure that section 1983 extended coverage to federal statutes
providing for equal rights.6 2 In short, as the Court noted, these conflicting
views6 3 militate against any assertion that the legislative history is disposi-
tive.6 4
58. The revised version provided:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1878) (emphasis added).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). The last sentence in the current codification was
added by Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284, to insure that citizens of the
District of Columbia have rights equal to those of citizens in states and territories. H.R. REP. No.
96-548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in, [1979] 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2609. See
note 1 supra. The Supreme Court had held in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973), that the District of Columbia was not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of
§ 1983.
60. Congress, when it created the Revision Commission, directed that changes and correc-
tions made by the Commission were to be annotated. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 3, 14 Stat.
75. No such annotation accompanied § 1979 of the Revised Statutes.
61. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 669 (1979) (White, J., concur-
ring in judgment).
62. 448 U.S. at 16 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 630 (1979)(Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist,
JJ., concurring). Cj. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 212 n.18 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). An extreme application of this view was made in Wynn v. Indiana State Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 316 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ind. 1970). The Wynn court held that only the legislative
history of the original 1871 enactment should be considered, thus ignoring the revision entirely.
Id. at 328.
63. For further discussion of the evolution of § 1983 and the interpretation of "and laws," see
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 n.7 (1972). See also Cover, supra note 55, at
7, 24-25; Herzer, supra note 54, at 4-9; Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State
Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1417-19 (1972); Note, Federal Judicial Review of
State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 109-15 (1967); Note, The Proper Scope of the
Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1287 (1953); Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for
the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 839, 840-43 (1964). These commentators
have focused on interpreting § 1983 in light of its historical confluence with the jurisdictional
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The Court further endeavored to blunt criticism of its reliance on the plain
meaning rule by attempting to draw a strong line of precedential support for
Thiboutot 115  Statements were found in opinions indicating that statutory
rights fall within the purview of section 1983.66 The Court also pointed to
its decisions interpreting the interplay of section 1983 and the Social Security
Act that allowed the actions to be decided solely on statutory grounds even
though deprivations of constitutional rights were also alleged.6 7 Contrary to
the majority's assertion, Thiboutot truly marks a departure from these prior
decisions in two fundamental ways. The first is that, while in some cases
dictum appears to state definitively that section 1983 applies to an alleged
violation of only a federal statutory right,68 cases not cited by the majority
specifically stated that the Court had not yet decided that question.69  The
second problem is that these statements were made merely as dicta without
any significant exposition of their basis or analysis of their import. 70  Thus,
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). In essence, the question they addressed was whether the phrase
"deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws" in § 1983 is limited by the
phrase "deprivation ... of any right . . . secured by the Constitution .. .or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights" in § 1343(3). The concern was not only to ferret out the
legislative intent in the discrepancy of the wording in order to determine the scope of § 1983, but
also to determine whether federal jurisdiction would be available depending on what the scope
of § 1983 was found to be. In Thiboutot, the issue of the availability of federal jurisdiction was
not relevant because the action was brought in state court. See note 21 and accompanying text
supra.
64. 448 U.S. at 7.
65. Id. at 4-5.
66. Id. See note 31 supra.
67. 448 U.S. at 5-6. See note 3 supra.
68. See note 31 supra.
69. The Court had opportunities to decide squarely whether the scope of § 1983 includes
claims based solely on an alleged conflict of state law with federal law, but expressly reserved the
question. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5 (1979) (college
not required by federal law to take affirmative action in admitting handicapped applicant who
does not qualify for admission); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974) (reserved
question of whether § 1983 can be used to vindicate statutory right provided by Social Security
Act); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968) (reserved question of whether claim can be
brought under § 1983 solely on grounds that state welfare law conflicts with federal welfare
law). Both Hagans and King, however, were brought in federal courts and alleged deprivations
of constitutional rights as well as statutory rights. Thus, it was not necessary for the Court to
decide whether only allegations of deprivations of statutory rights were sufficient for bringing
the § 1983 actions. The constitutional claims provided the jurisdictional base. 448 U.S. at 6. In
Davis, the Court decided the case on the merits, making it unnecessary to decide whether § 1983
provided a separate cause of action. 442 U.S. at 404 n.5.
70. 448 U.S. at 31 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The dissent
focused on the statements in Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), and Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), that the majority cited as precedent for its decision. See note 31 and
accompanying text supra. Greenwood cited only § 1983 itself and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), which was decided on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. The dictum from
Edelman relied upon by the majority was a statement interpreting Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970), which erroneously labeled Rosado as a § 1983 case. As the dissenters in Thiboutot
pointed out, § 1983 was not expressly addressed in Rosado. 448 U.S. at 30. (Burger, C.J., and
Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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by relying only upon the dubious plain meaning of section 1983, bolstered
minimally by the ambiguity of the statute's legislative history and cursory
dicta in prior decisions, the Court failed to adequately support its decision.
Alternative Basis for the Thiboutot Decision
Rather than "almost casually" 7' holding as it did, the Court had sufficient
basis in public policy for holding that the scope of section 1983 extends to
violations of federal statutory rights. The Court should have relied on the
recent statement of congressional policy regarding the interpretation of sec-
tion 1983. This policy is reflected in the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act. Although a subsequent legislative construction
of a statute is not binding on a court, it is a valuable aid in resolving doubts
in the interpretation of a statute. 72
The congressional proponents of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act unequivocally stated that the Act provided an additional remedy for
violations of federal statutory rights, as well as deprivations of constitutional
rights under section 1983. 73 The readily apparent legislative intent was to
enable an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a section 1983
action involving only a federal statutory claim. Thus, it would have been
both incongruous and contrary to legislative intent for the Thiboutot Court
to have asserted, as the dissent did, that section 1983 is inapplicable to a
federal statutory claim. The Thiboutot Court failed to rely on this legislative
71. 448 U.S. at 11 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
72. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (unanimous
decision) (views of subsequent Congresses are accorded significant weight in determining power
of Secretary of Commerce to permanently release trade restrictions on vessels when intent of
enacting Congress is unclear); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275-85 (1974)
(clarification of prior labor statute by a subsequent Congress' legislation is given significant
weight in determining basic policy questions); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
380-81 (1969) (subsequent legislation regarding political equal time provisions that clarifies
intent of prior related statute is to be given great weight in construing the prior statute). Cf.
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (observations of later Congress will not
override clear intent of enacting Congress). See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 47, § 49.11.
73. Sponsors in both the House of Representatives and the Senate believed the Act should
apply to violations of rights provided by federal statutory law. "Section 1983 protects civil and
constitutional rights from abridgement [sic] by state and local officials. . . . Under applicable
judicial decisions, Section 1983 authorizes suits against State and local officials based upon
Federal statutory as well as constitutional rights." 122 CONG. REc. 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep.
Drinan). "This legislation [Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act] is intended to cover cases
based on both constitutional and statutory rights, including supremacy clause cases. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983." 122 CONC. REC. 33315 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk). The Senate report on
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act stated that the legislation is intended to award
attorney's fees in cases brought under § 1983, a statute for "redressing violations of the Federal
Constitution or laws by officials sworn to uphold the laws." S. REF. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5911 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. See also Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Congress clearly intended the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act to apply to statutory
claims brought under § 1983), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
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history in interpreting section 1983, using it instead only as support for the
Court's reading of the plain meaning of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act. 74  The Court's failure to highlight this current congressional
intent and formulation of public policy regarding section 1983 placed the
Court in the less tenable position of relying on historical ambiguity and
congressional silence as interpretive tools of legislative intent.
In view of the Court's prior restrictive Social Security Act and section 1983
decisions, the Thiboutot decision, if not the Court's specific method of reach-
ing it, is necessary to preserve the individual's ability to seek redress for state
violations of the federal AFDC program. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act was intended, in part, to encourage the vindication of federal
statutory rights75 by private litigants. 76  Under prior Supreme Court deci-
sions, no private right of action against a state exists under the Social Security
Act, thereby necessitating the use of section 1983 by a AFDC recipient who
sought to conform a state welfare program with federal law. 77  Federal
jurisdiction, however, does not exist for the usual Social Security Act case
brought under section 1983 because of the minimal amount of money in-
volved 78 or the lack of a constitutional claim. 79 Moreover, even if the action
were maintainable in federal court, an award of retroactive AFDC benefits,
a desired and just remedy for one whose benefits were erroneously denied,
cannot be obtained in federal court.8 0 The Thiboutots prevailed on the
merits in state court, but a different interpretation of section 1983 in
Thiboutot would have denied them the legislatively intended remedy of an
award of attorney's fees for statutorily based section 1983 actions81 in state
court. Such a decision, when combined with the virtual foreclosure of AFDC
cases in federal court, would have prevented any private enforcement of
74. 448 U.S. at 9-10. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
75. See note 73 supra.
76. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
77. 448 U.S. at 3.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. III 1979) (federal jurisdiction requires amount in controversy
of $10,000). See Federal Hearing, supra note 1, at 1344-45. Subsequent to the Thiboutot
decision, the jurisdictional amount was eliminated from § 1331 by the Federal Question Jurisdic-
tional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369.
79. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 611-15 (1979); Oldham v.
Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 166 (8th Cir. 1980) (under Chapman, mere inconsistency of state welfare
regulation with Social Security Act does not invoke a constitutional right within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1343); McManama v. Lukhard, 616 F.2d 727, 728-29 (4th Cir. 1980) (Chapman
precluded argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) provides federal jurisdiction when merely a
conflict between a state regulation and federal law is asserted).
80. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-74 (1974). In Edelman, the Court held that the
eleventh amendment prohibits an award of retroactive welfare benefits against a state. Id.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, likened such an award to damages. Id. at 668. Cf.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979) (§ 1983 does not abrogate states' sovereign
immunity under eleventh amendment). See generally Note, The Outlook for Welfare Litigation
in The Federal Courts: Hagans v. Lavine & Edelman v. Jordan, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 897, 903-06
(1975).
81. See note 73 supra.
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state compliance with federal law, the very policy Congress wanted to
encourage by enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.8 2
IMPACT OF THE THIBOUTOT DECISION
Beyond the immediate impact of providing a remedy for the Thiboutots,
the most tangible result of the Thiboutot decision, is the enlarged category of
section 1983 actions and the resulting awards of attorney's fees under section
1988. Potentially, any federal statute which cooperatively involves a state
can now give rise to a claim under section 1983 whenever a violation of the
statute by the state is alleged.8" Furthermore, a prevailing claimant in such
an action may then be awarded attorney's fees from the state under section
1988. Consequently, plaintiffs may begin to append section 1983 claims to
complaints merely to recover attorney's fees.8 4  The Thiboutot dissenters
feared the erosion of the protection provided to the states by the "American
Rule"8 5 of attorney's fees awards8 and, consequently, a weakening of state
treasuries. 8 7
82. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
83. 448 U.S. at 22 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). A partial list of
statutes that may now give rise to § 1983 actions is provided in an appendix to the dissent in
Thiboutot. Id. at 34-37. Dictim in two post-Thiboutot decisions has indicated that § 1983 is not
available to a plaintiff when a federal statute provides an exclusive remedy. Middlesex County
Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626 (1981); Pennjurst State
School and Hosp. v. Halderman. 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1545 (1981).
84. Both the defendants and dissenters in Thiboutot believed the plaintiffs had done just
that. Id. at 24 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner at
17-18. The express use of § 1983, however, may not even be necessary in order to recover
attorney's fees under § 1988. For example, the court in La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F. Supp.
904 (N.D. Cal. 1977), held that § 1983 need not even be pleaded in order to award attorney's
fees under § 1988. A judicial finding that the state had deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by federal laws is sufficient to imply a § 1983 action and, thereby, make
possible an award of attorney's fees under § 1988. Id. at 907-08. Cf. Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d
199 (8th Cir. 1980) (case remanded for consideration of award of attorney's fees under
§ 1988 even though prevailing plaintiff failed to mention § 1988 in application for attorney's
fees).
85. The general rule in the United States is that a prevailing litigant must bear his own
attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(prevailing party in federal litigation brought to prevent issuance of permits for construction of
pipeline is not entitled to recover attorney's fees absent statutory authorization). See generally D.
DoBBs, LAW OF REMEDIEs 194-200 (1973). One judically created exception to the "American
Rule" has been to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party whose litigation vindicated
important public rights or furthered the public interest. See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471
F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1975) (vindication of first and fourteenth amendment rights in action brought
under § 1983 is a public benefit warranting award of attorney's fees against state officials);
Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (prevailing plaintiff in racial
discrimination action brought under § 1982 is entitled to award of attorney's fees for vindicating
public right); United Steelworkers v. Butler Mfg. Co., 439 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1971) (union's
suit on breach of contract warrants award of attorney's fees because it enforced national labor
policy). This exception was precluded after Alyeska. 421 U.S. at 263-64. The Civil Rights
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The damage to the state fisc, however, does have checks. Although an
award of attorney's fees generally is to be made to the prevailing party unless
such an award would be unjust,88 the award is discretionary both as to
amount and as to whether a party is considered to have prevailed.89 Courts
have developed criteria for determining a reasonable attorney's fee.90 For
example, some courts have limited the fees recoverable to the time actually
Attorney's Fees Awards Act was enacted in large part to reinstate the exception statutorily. S.
REP., supra note 73, at 1, 4, 6, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908-09,
5911, 5913. Subsequent court decisions have followed this expression of legislative intent. See,
e.g., Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1978); White v.
Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1978); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 440 F. Supp. 904, 907
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
86. 448 U.S. at 24 (Burger, C.J., and Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
87. Id. This objection was implicitly rejected in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), when
the Court stated that "[t]he greater resources available to governments provide an ample base
from which fees can be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in suits against government officials
or entities." Id. at 694 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1976)).
88. S. RP., supra note 73, at 4, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908,
5912, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). This
legislative intent has been followed in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Iranian Students Ass'n v.
Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1979); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578
F.2d, 34, 37-38; Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 919 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Awards of attorney's
fees are not necessarily limited to prevailing plaintiffs. Awards to prevailing defendants have
been made where the § 1983 claim was frivolous. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cazares,
638 F.2d 1272, 1290 (5th Cir. 1981) (despite sustaining plaintiff's complaint for over two years
and novelty of legal issues); Kane v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 586, 592-593 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (persistent bringing of meritless civil rights actions); Goff v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 429
F. Supp. 973, 976 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (no contention of state action in § 1983 action brought
against private corporation). Cf. Hughes v. Rowe, 101 S. Ct. 173, 178-79 (1980) (per curiam)
(prevailing defendant in action brought under § 1983 may be awarded attorney's fees if suit was
"frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad
faith"). There is nothing in Thiboutot to indicate that such awards are precluded. Congressional
proponents of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act even argued that it was intended, in
part, to prevent frivolous law suits. 122 CONG. REc. 31832 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Abourezk and
Sen. Hathaway).
89. See, e.g., Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978) (determination of whether
requested attorney's fees are reasonable is within the trial court's discretion); Tobeluk v. Lind,
589 P.2d 873, 879-80 (Ala. 1979) (court retains its discretion in determining whether a party has
prevailed within meaning of § 1988).
90. The final report on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act endorsed the standards
applied in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). S.
REP., supra note 73, at 5916, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5913.
Relevant factors are as follows: (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of issue
involved; (3) legal skill required; (4) preclusion of other employment due to acceptance of case;
(5) customary fee in the community; (6) whether fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by client or situation; (8) amount of money involved and results obtained; (9) attorney's
reputation, experience, and ability; (10) undesirability of the case; (11) nature and length of
professional relationship with client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See also Muscare v.
Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1980); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672, 676 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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spent on issues which were not frivolous,9 1 on which the plaintiff prevailed,9 2
and for which time records could be presented.9 3  Also, the possibility of
greater financial liability may act as an inducement to the states to make a
greater effort to meet the requirements of federal laws and regulations.9 4
Furthermore, the very purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act is to encourage private enforcement of rights.95 The potential for
abuse" must be tolerated to promote what Congress has deemed the greater
public good of private enforcement of rights. Finally, although states are no
longer protected by the "American Rule" in section 1983 actions, the poten-
tial liability for attorney's fees in statutorily-based section 1983 actions is "no
startling new remedy"' 7 and is not unique to section 1983 actions. Numerous
legislative enactments provide for an award of attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing party in actions that Congress has determined warrant such awards.98
This legislative decision weakens the "American Rule" no more than any of
these other statutes that provide attorney's fees.
91. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1979) (hours expended by
attorneys of prevailing plaintiffs in school desegregation suit may be reduced by amount of time
spent in duplicative or frivolous claims), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1981). Merely because
research on a particular issue was unproductive, however, does not necessitate a reduction in
hours claimed. Id. at 636.
92. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978) (attorneys of prisoners who
prevailed on library access issue must divide time attributable to that issue from time expended
on other issues). But see Crain v. City of Mountain Home, 611 F.2d 726, 729 n.7 (8th Cir. 1979)
(award of attorney's fees under § 1988 should not be limited to hours spent on issues on which
plaintiff prevails).
93. Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(to determine reasonable hourly rate in award of attorney's fees under § 1988, the court must be
given time logs or affidavits of hours spent, identifying attorneys and activities).
94. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 401 (D. Colo. 1977) (availability of
attorney's fees award encouraged law suit, without which school desegregation would not have
been achieved).
95. S. REP., supra note 73, at 2, reprinted in [19761 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5908,
5910. Congress deemed awards of attorney's fees an "essential" element in the private citizens'
quest to vindicate their rights and to enforce congressional policy. Id.
96. See notes 84 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
97. S. REP., supra note 73, at 6, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWs 5908,
5913.
98. Congress has enacted over ninety such statutes. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D Snss., SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, Tsxrs, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS
ACT OF 1976 (PuBaIC LAW 94-559, S. 2278) 303-13 (Comm. Print 1976). See also Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33; 122 CONG. REc. 35123 (1976) (comments of Rep.
Drinan). One of the most commonly used statutes that provides for awards of attorney's fees is
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. It provides that "the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs. . . . '42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (unani-
mous decision) (Brennan & Stevens, JJ., concurring separately), the Court held that an action
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for sex discrimination was enforceable against a state.
Id. at 456-57. Given the express congressional authority for awards of attorney's fees in the Act, a
state may also be required to pay the attorney's fees of the prevailing plaintiff. Id. at 457.
MAINE
Clearly, as a result of Thiboutot, deprivation of a constitutional right or
an equal right provided statutorily by Congress is no longer a prerequisite for
a valid section 1983 claim. Although the Court, prior to Thiboutot, had
recognized that the two allegations necessary for stating a claim under
section 1983 were a deprivation of a federal right and a deprivation of that
right under color of state law, °9 it was unclear whether all federal statutory
rights constituted such federal rights within the meaning of section 1983. The
decisions of lower courts on this issue were far from uniform. 00 Thus, the
Court's clearly articulated result in Thiboutot should provide, at last, the
needed national uniformity in actions involving federal statutory rights.
CONCLUSION
The impact of Maine v. Thiboutot is clear and substantial. A state's
violation of a federal, and purely statutory, right will give rise to a claim
under section 1983. The prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees. All
programs administered by states under federal guidelines are now potential
bases for section 1983 actions if a state violates a federal law or regulation.
Although the Court's result is clear, its rationale is weak because it relied on
the arguable plain meaning of section 1983, on the confusion surrounding
legislative history, and on dicta. A clear pronouncement of public policy for
allowing such actions, as set forth in the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, while not changing the immediate result, would
have buttressed the opinion against future assaults on the individual's at-
tempts to survive in the welfare state.
Owen M. Field
99. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (unanimous decision) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring) (defendant in § 1983 action who may have qualified immunity must plead good faith as
affirmative defense); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
100. See note 7 supra.
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